The words of email authentication, in plain English.
DMARC, SPF, DKIM and the tags around them, each said once, with an example and the free tool that checks it. Written for the person who has to set them up for a client.
The records what a domain publishes in DNS
DMARCDomain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance
A TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> that tells receiving mail servers what to do with mail that fails SPF and DKIM alignment, and where to send reports about the mail they saw. Defined in RFC 9989.
_dmarc.pellowyn-dental.example TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@pellowyn-dental.example"
Check it with the DMARC checkerSee also p=, rua=, Alignment
SPFSender Policy Framework
A TXT record on the domain listing the servers allowed to send mail with that domain in the envelope sender. A receiver checks the connecting server against it. Defined in RFC 7208.
pellowyn-dental.example TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all"
Check it with the SPF checkerSee also Envelope sender, The 10-lookup limit, include
DKIMDomainKeys Identified Mail
A signature the sending service adds to each message, checked against a public key the domain publishes. It proves the message was signed by a holder of the domain's key and was not changed on the way. Defined in RFC 6376.
Check it with the DKIM checkerSee also Selector, DKIM-Signature, Alignment
Selectorwhich DKIM key to use
The name a DKIM key is published under, so a domain can have several keys, one per sending service. The key lives at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. DNS cannot list a domain's selectors; they are found in the s= tag of a message's DKIM-Signature header, or in DMARC reports.
selector1._domainkey.pellowyn-dental.example
BIMIBrand Indicators for Message Identification
A TXT record at default._bimi.<domain> pointing at the brand's logo, so supporting mailbox providers can show it beside authenticated mail. It needs DMARC at quarantine or reject, and most large providers also need a certificate.
default._bimi.pellowyn-dental.example TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://pellowyn-dental.example/logo.svg"
Check it with the BIMI checkerSee also VMC and CMC, SVG Tiny PS
MTA-STSSMTP MTA Strict Transport Security
A TXT record and a policy file served over HTTPS that tell sending servers to deliver to the domain's mail servers only over verified TLS. It protects mail in transit rather than proving who sent it. Defined in RFC 8461.
TLS-RPTSMTP TLS Reporting
A TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain> asking sending servers to report failed TLS connections to the domain. The partner of MTA-STS. Defined in RFC 8460.
_smtp._tls.pellowyn-dental.example TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls@pellowyn-dental.example"
See also MTA-STS
MX recordwhere the domain receives mail
The DNS record naming the servers that accept mail for the domain. A domain that sends no mail and receives none can publish a null MX, a single MX of "." (RFC 7505).
pellowyn-dental.example MX 0 pellowyn-dental-example.mail.protection.outlook.com
See also MTA-STS
The checks what a receiver works out for each message
Envelope senderMAIL FROM, Return-Path, RFC5321.MailFrom
The address the sending server gives before the message itself, where bounces go. SPF checks this domain. People rarely see it, and a service often sets it to its own domain.
Return-Path: <bounces+12345@em.mailservice.example>
See also Header From, SPF, Alignment
Header Fromthe From line people see, RFC5322.From
The address shown as the sender in a mail client. DMARC protects this domain: it asks whether SPF or DKIM passed for a domain that matches it.
From: Pellowyn Dental <reminders@pellowyn-dental.example>
See also Alignment, Envelope sender
DKIM-Signaturethe header DKIM adds
The header a signing service adds to a message. Its d= tag names the signing domain and its s= tag the selector, which together say where the public key is.
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=pellowyn-dental.example; s=selector1; ...
Alignmentthe check DMARC adds
Whether the domain SPF or DKIM passed for matches the header From domain. Mail passes DMARC when SPF passes and aligns, or DKIM passes and aligns. A pass for some other domain does not count.
See also Relaxed and strict alignment, Header From, DMARC pass
Relaxed and strict alignmentadkim and aspf
Relaxed, the default, accepts a match on the organisational domain, so mail.pellowyn-dental.example aligns with pellowyn-dental.example. Strict needs the exact same name. Set per check with adkim=s and aspf=s.
adkim=r; aspf=r
Check it with the DMARC generatorSee also Alignment, Organisational domain
DMARC passthe verdict
A message passes DMARC when at least one of SPF and DKIM passes for a domain aligned with the header From. Otherwise it fails, and the receiver applies the published policy.
includean SPF mechanism
Pulls another domain's SPF record into this one, the usual way to authorise a service. Each include costs a DNS lookup, and so does everything inside it.
include:_spf.google.com
The 10-lookup limitSPF's permerror
A receiver stops after 10 DNS lookups while checking SPF (include, a, mx, ptr, exists and redirect each cost one, counted through every include) and returns a permanent error, so SPF fails for every message. More than 2 lookups that find nothing (void lookups) can fail it too.
Check it with the SPF checkerSee also include, SPF flattening
SPF flatteninga fix for too many lookups
Replacing includes with the address ranges they resolve to, so the record costs fewer lookups. The ranges change when a service changes them, so a flattened record has to be kept up to date, which is why it is usually managed by a service.
See also The 10-lookup limit
ARCAuthenticated Received Chain
Headers a forwarder or mailing list adds to record the authentication results it saw before it changed the message, so a later receiver can choose to trust them. Defined in RFC 8617.
See also Forwarding
The policy what the DMARC record asks for
p=the policy tag
What a receiver should do with mail that fails DMARC. none: deliver it as usual, and report. quarantine: treat it as suspicious, usually the spam folder. reject: refuse it. The usual path is none, then quarantine, then reject, once the reports show every real sender passing.
p=none p=quarantine p=reject
sp= and np=policies for subdomains
sp sets the policy for subdomains that exist; without it they follow p. np sets it for subdomains that do not exist, which only a forger would send from.
p=quarantine; sp=reject; np=reject
See also p=, Organisational domain
t=ytesting mode
Asks receivers to treat failing mail one step softer while a stronger policy is tried: quarantine as none, reject as quarantine. It replaced pct= in RFC 9989.
p=reject; t=y
pct=retired
Once applied the policy to a percentage of failing mail. RFC 9989 retired it, along with rf= and ri=; newer receivers ignore it and apply p to all failing mail. Use t=y instead.
See also t=y
Enforcementquarantine or reject
A DMARC policy that does something to failing mail. At p=none a domain is monitored but not protected: anyone can still send as it.
The reports what receivers send back
rua=where aggregate reports go
The addresses that receive aggregate reports, as mailto: URIs, separated by commas. Without rua nobody is told who sends as the domain, so moving to enforcement is guesswork.
rua=mailto:dmarc@pellowyn-dental.example
Check it with the DMARC generatorSee also Aggregate report, External report authorisation
Aggregate reportthe daily summary, in XML
A file a receiver such as Google, Microsoft or Yahoo sends, usually once a day, listing every server that sent mail as the domain, how many messages, and whether SPF, DKIM and DMARC passed. It holds no message content.
See also rua=, Report organisation
ruf= and failure reportsper-message samples
ruf asks for a report about each failing message, which can include its headers and so personal data. Few receivers send them. fo= sets when one is sent: 0 when every check fails (the default), 1 when any fails, d for DKIM, s for SPF.
ruf=mailto:dmarc-failures@pellowyn-dental.example; fo=1
See also Aggregate report
Report organisationwho sent the report
The mailbox provider or company that produced a report, named in it, such as google.com or Outlook.com. One organisation's report covers only the mail it received.
See also Aggregate report
External report authorisationreports to another domain
When rua points at another domain, receivers send reports there only if that domain agrees, with a TXT record of v=DMARC1 at <your domain>._report._dmarc.<their domain>. Monitoring services publish it for every customer.
pellowyn-dental.example._report._dmarc.reports.service.example TXT "v=DMARC1"
See also rua=
Domains and senders who mail claims to come from
Organisational domainthe registered domain
The domain someone registered, such as pellowyn-dental.example for mail.pellowyn-dental.example. Relaxed alignment and subdomain policy are worked out from it; RFC 9989 finds it by looking for DMARC records up the name's labels.
See also Relaxed and strict alignment, sp= and np=, psd=
psd=public suffix domain
Marks a domain as a public suffix, like a country code domain whose operator publishes DMARC for names under it. psd=y is for those operators only; on an ordinary domain it changes which domain counts as organisational.
See also Organisational domain
Spoofingsending as someone else
Mail that puts a domain in the From line without the owner's permission, the basis of most phishing. DMARC at enforcement stops exact-domain spoofing at receivers that check it; it does not stop look-alike domains.
See also Enforcement, Header From
Forwardingwhy some real mail fails
When a message is forwarded or sent through a mailing list, SPF usually fails because the forwarder's server is not in the record, and DKIM fails if the message was changed. DKIM that survives, or ARC, keeps it passing.
Sending servicea sender on the domain
Any system that sends mail as the domain: the mailbox host (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace), marketing tools, ticketing, invoicing, a website's contact form. Each needs SPF or DKIM set up for the domain before enforcement.
The logo BIMI's requirements
VMC and CMClogo certificates
A Verified Mark Certificate proves a logo is a registered trademark of the domain's owner; a Common Mark Certificate covers a logo without a trademark that has been in use. Gmail and Apple Mail show a BIMI logo only with one of them, named in the a= tag.
Check it with the BIMI checkerSee also BIMI
SVG Tiny PSthe logo file format
The restricted SVG profile BIMI logos must use: baseProfile="tiny-ps", version 1.2, a title, no scripts, animation or links to outside files, and a square image, served over HTTPS.
Check it with the BIMI checkerSee also BIMI
The free tools
The words explain it. The reports show it.
DNS says what a domain asks receivers to do. Only the reports receivers send say what happened to its mail. DMARC Harbor reads those reports for every client domain, every day, names each service sending as it, and says when it is safe to move to p=reject.